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MAKING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
WORK: THE VIEW FROM THE TRENCH
(A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
GLENNON)
By George R. Berdes * andRobert T Huber**
Due to the recent, untimely death of Representative Clement J.
Zablocki, the need for a response to Professor Michael Glennon's critique of Chairman Zablocki's last major statement on the War Powers
Resolution, published in this issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review, has fallen on those who had the privilege to work for him in
the formulation and implementation of the War Powers Resolution.
At the outset, we can find scattered points of agreement with Mr.
Glennon. First, we wholeheartedly agree that the Chairman's death
occurred "at a most untimely moment."' Great leaders often do not
see the complete fulfillment of their work. Nonetheless, the late Chairman's stewardship in the enactment of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution brought him closer to the objectives of section 2(a) of
the War Powers Resolution than ever before.
Second, we agree that the more effective implementation of the
Resolution has been slowed by less than vigorous congressional oversight. In his article, Zablocki concurred, suggesting methods for improvement. Nonetheless, in examining past efforts in this regard we
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1. Glennon, The War PowersResolution: SadRecord,DismalPromise, 17 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 657, 657 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Glennon].
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Unfortunately, the overwhelming remainder of the Glennon article can be divided between those points on which he is misinformed
and those on which he is simply mistaken. We will leave it to the
reader to decide which is worse.
In the case of the former, we begin by saying that it is simply not
true that the House conferees preferred no law to the Senate version of
the War Powers Resolution. Rather, what they wanted-and got-was
a compromise version that would pass both Houses over a presidential
veto. Professor Glennon's insistence on the Senate version (which was
far from perfect as we shall demonstrate in a moment) would have sacrificed effective legislative action for the sake of political purity. Furthermore, as Mr. Glennon must know, conference committees are
designed to compromise conflicting versions of legislation, not to insist
on ideological or institutional purity. Both House and Senate conferees
realized this point and the Resolution, in fact, includes the best elements of both versions.
Also, the notion that Chairman Zablocki did not "express any disagreement with the initial introduction of the armed forces into hostilities in Lebanon"'3 is simply not true. In a 1982 letter from Chairman
Zablocki to President Reagan as well as in a 1982 Washington Post
article, (both of which are referenced in the Zablocki article in this volume), Zablocki demanded that the President submit a section 4(a)(1)
report to the Congress.4
Finally, it is "absolute nonsense," to use Mr. Glennon's own
words, to suggest that Representative Zablocki confuses presidential
acceptance of and agreement with the War Powers Resolution.5 It matters little whether or not the President agrees with the Resolution.
What matters much more is that the President accepted the Resolution's application to Lebanon and signed legislation to that effect. The
clear implication of Professor Glennon's arguments, that the law of the
land is less important than presidential reservations about such laws,
captures the cynicism which undermines all law.
Secretary Shultz's assertions about the constitutional necessity of
(1983); War Powers: A Test of ComplianceRelative to the DanangSealpft, the Evacuation of
,PhnomPenh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident, 197.5: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on In'tl Security & Scienific Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
3. Glennon, supra note 1, at 662.
4. See letter from Hon. Clement J.Zablocki, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, to President Ronald Reagan (July 6, 1982); Zablocki, Reagan is Skirting the War
PowersAct, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1982, § 2, at 7, col. 2.
5. Glennon, supra note I, at 667-68.
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the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, one would assume, are
less important than the fact that the Administration closely, observed its
terms. Such compliance itself brought an important albeit grudging acknowledgement that the executive branch is moving toward acceptance
of the Resolution and its provisions. There is no question that Chief
Executives "would prefer to forget" 6 the War Powers Resolution. The
point is they cannot.
We now turn to the large group of mistaken elements in the Glennon article. First, one cannot help but be struck by the nostalgic, almost religious, devotion to the so-called "recognized powers" section of
the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution that was rejected by
the House-Senate Conference Committee in 1973. Because Professor
Glennon does not provide the reader with an explanation as to why this
section was eliminated, we feel obliged to do so.
The Senate bill attempted to catalog various conditions under
which the President would be permitted to make emergency use of
United States Armed Forces without prior congressional approval and
by implication deny any such use in situations which were, not specified. The House resolution had no such provision. The House, both in
its committee and on the floor, struggled with this problem and for
sound reasons decided against listing of any conditions.
The attempt to define precisely and exclusively the circumstances
under which authority could be exercised raises the very constitutional
problems it seeks to avoid. Congress cannot define the "recognized
powers" of the President. The development of all-inclusive list of authorized actions was correctly judged by the House and Senate conferees to be an impossible task. There are unavoidable gray areas of
potential war power where some see broad presidential powers and
others see narrow ones.
The Senate bill never resolved this question of defined powers and
never dealt with the issue of whether it purported to grant certain presidential powers by statute or whether the catalog of powers in the Senate bill were recognized powers. The confusion of this approach
hoisted the provision on its own petard.
By contrast, the House resolution reflected the concurrent nature
of powers governing the emergency use of United States Armed Forces.
Equally important, it reflected the political reality of the twentieth century which makes the use of such forces by the President, without prior
congressional approval in certain circumstances, virtually unavoidable.
6. Id
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It is therefore of significant importance that procedures for congressional action, triggered by the performance of certain actions by the
President, be established.
The constitutionality of presidential action will always be in the
eyes of the beholder. The Congress, however, cannot wait for the definitive judgment of constitutionality. It must act in a manner which
preserves its war powers prerogatives as well as advances United States
foreign policy interests as Congress sees them in particular situations
where troops have been deployed. Through sections 4(a)(1), 5(b) and
5(c), Congress exercises that judgment in a firm and final manner.
Lest this criticism be seen as the product of the institutional bias of
the House, one need only read the supplemental views of former Senator J. William Fulbright, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, regarding the Senate bill. Significantly, it was Mr.
Fulbright who argued persuasively that the recognized powers approach may go too far in the direction of executive prerogative, especially in allowing the President to take action not only to "'repel an
armed attack' but also to forestall the direct and imminent threat of
such an attack."7 Fulbright also argued that the Senate approach could
even provide sanction for a nuclear first strike based solely on the judgment of the President.8 As the obvious shortcomings of the "recognized powers" approach became clear, the Senate conferees agreed to
drop this unworkable provision.
Appropriately, that legislative debate was settled over a decade
ago. The Senate conferees realistically recognized that this element of
the Senate bill would simply not work. Nothing has transpired since
then to suggest otherwise. Nonetheless, Professor Glennon's insistence
on flogging this dead horse apparently has no limits. Regrettably,
Glennon's attack colors both his political judgment and his critique of
the current terms of the War Powers Resolution.
The internal "inconsistency" of the Resolution, as we have already
stated, is more accurately an honest concession to the fact that both the
President and Congress would continue disputing the question of who
controls the decision to commit troops into hostilities. How Congress
would respond to exercises of executive power-whether they viewed
them as constitutional or not-was the most important political question. The flexibility to terminate or to authorize the use of troops was
7. WAR POWERS, S.REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (statement by Hon, J.W.
Fulbright).
8. I, see also 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2358-59 (supplemental views regarding S.440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)).
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ultimately the vital issue. The genius of the Resolution is that it accomplishes this dual task as appropriate to the reality of circumstance.
Rather than seeing effective political action as the objective, Mr.
Glennon prefers ruffled lace legal niceties and a quest for neatly defined categories where there are none. This is particularly puzzling
since even Professor Glennon's preferred Senate approach would have
allowed the President to use United States Armed Forces without prior
congressional approval. As one House Foreign Affairs Committee
member said during the Lebanon war powers debate, "[o]ne of the
signs of maturity in both personal life and political life is to be able to
live with ambiguity. Ambiguity is not a sign of incomprehension ...
Ambiguity often enables democratic governments to function."9
As to the definition of "hostilities," we must assume Professor
Glennon has read the House report accompanying its version of the
War Powers Resolution which defined the term in detail.'0 In fact, the
word "hostilities" was substituted for the phrase "armed conflict" during Committee consideration and was defined, in addition to a situation in which fighting had actually begun, to encompass "a state of
confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a
clear and present danger of armed conflict."" "Imminent hostilities"
was defined as "a situation in which there is a clear potential either for
' 12
such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict."
Despite this clear legislative history, Professor Glennon accurately
pointed out that "it seemed utterly disingenuous to claim, as the Reagan Administration did, that the hostilities test was not met."' 13 What
he fails to understand, however, is that the problem is not the lack of
definition but the Executive's disregard for the law.
We would be delighted to hear how Professor Glennon would define the words "to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its
territories and possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retaliatory actions in the event of an attack and to forestall the direct and
imminent threat of such an attack."'14 Yet these were the
words con9. StatutoryAuthorization Under the War PowersResolution--Lebanon, 1983: Hearings
Before the House Commn on ForeignAffairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1983) (statement of
Hon. Tom Lantos).
10. WAR POWERs, H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as
House Report on War Powers].
11. Id at7.
12. Id; see also 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2358-63 (supplemental and minority views to H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)).
13. Glennon, supra note 1, at 664.
14. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 25,119-20 (1973).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

tained in the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution. Senator
Fulbright accurately pointed out that such a standard would enable the

President to do almost anything without congressional approval. To
replace a clear definition with a less clear one to ensure the "proper

operation"' 5 of the Resolution makes little sense.
This leads to the next criticism in Professor Glennon's article,
namely, that consultation has been perfunctory because Congress has
allowed the President "time after time, to get away with perfunctory
consultation."16 Consultation will always be a difficult process. We
recognize that acceptable procedures for such consultation should be
explored in greater detail, although the Hughes-Ryan experience

7

in-

dicates this is far easier said than done.
What disturbs us is the clear implication that while "it is not terribly useful to rail against the executive branch' ' I about consultation, it
is perfectly acceptable to rail against Congress' record on this issue.
Whatever failings Congress has had in not "living up to its responsibilities under the role it carved out for itself under the Resolution,"' 9 they
pale in comparison to executive branch arrogance in not complying
with the spirit or, in most instances, the letter of the law. In resolving
disputes concerning the War Powers Resolution, it is reasonable to expect the President to act in good faith regarding consultation, and to
15. Glennon, supra note 1, at 664.
16. Id. at 665.
17. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, adopted in 1974, required reporting "in a timely
fashion" of covert intelligence activities to "appropriate committees of the Congress." Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, § 32, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795 (1974).
In attempting to comply with the amendment, the executive branch ultimately reported
to eight committees (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Budget, and Armed
Services). The unwieldy nature of such reporting, which was expected to be prior reporting
in most cases, contributed to the provision's repeal in 1980. See Role of Intelligence in the
Foreign Policy Process, 1980: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security & Scientific
Affairs of the House Comn on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 170-98, 237 (1980).
The House and Senate sponsors of the War P6wers Resolution also grappled with this
problem. The House Resolution originally called for consultation "in every possible instance with the leadership and appropriate committees of Congress." The final version of
the Resolution merely called for consultation "with Congress." Ultimately, even if a consultative framework concerning the War Powers Resolution could be worked out, cooperative
relations between the Executive and Congress are crucial. Consultation means "that a decision is pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of
action contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful, the President himself
must participate and all information relevant to the situation must be made available."
House Report on War Powers, supra note 10, at 6-7.
18. Glennon, supra note 1, at 659.
19. Id. at 659-60.
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"faithfully execute" the law of the land (including the reporting requirements of section 4(a)(1)), even if the law is not "convenient."
Laying the blame on an easy mark like Congress is self-defeating for
those who purportedly seek to protect its prerogatives.
Finally, Chairman Zablocki has already acknowledged in his article that some changes in the Resolution may be "desirable at an appropriate political moment. 2 ° Suggestions like requiring that the
President specify the subsection of section 4 under which he is reporting to Congress, deserve careful study. But given executive branch
hostility, new techniques for non-compliance might result even if such
an amendment were included. It is also noteworthy to remind Professor Glennon that the Senate insisted that the provisions triggering the
time limits in subsections 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3) be removed.
It is satisfying that the Resolution remains unamended because no
approach has yet been devised that would strengthen the Resolution
and Congress' role in war powers. Evidence concerning this point
comes from the reality that neither the Senate nor the House has seen
fit to act on such revisions. Until an approach which attracts wide
political support in Congress is found, the amendment process should
be approached with caution.
By contrast, Mr. Glennon's solution to possible deficiencies in the
Resolution is, not surprisingly, the "recognized powers" approach of
the Senate version. Despite recognition by both the House and the
Senate that the approach will not work, Mr. Glennon continues the
practice of killing the messenger, and apparently feels killing the Resolution is the best course of action if his long-discredited pet approach is
not enshrined in the law.
We are frankly disappointed at Mr. Glennon's criticism of Mr.
Zablocki's political acumen regarding the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (MFLR).2 1 In one sense this is not surprising. The
Senate had very little to do with the crafting of the MFLR. In fact it
adopted the House version virtually intact after it had been negotiated
by House Democrats led by Chairman Zablocki and the Reagan Administration. Having been advised by Napoleon through Mr. Glennon
20. Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record and Future Promise, 17 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 579, 598 (1984).
21. Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983). See Professor Glennon's comments concerning the major concessions extracted from the executive branch in the formulation of the
Lebanon War Powers Resolution and his comment that "[o]ne wonders how Rep. Zablocki
emerged from those 'tough negotiations' without agreeing to apologize for his sponsorship of
the War Powers Resolution." Glennon, supra note 1, at 667.
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"that the tools belong to the man who can use them," 22 we are
chagrined at then being told that staying off the war powers battlefield
would have been preferable for legislative prerogatives.
In no way did Chairman Zablocki insist that the Resolution posed
no restraints on presidential war-making power. In fact, the MFLR
did precisely that. Professor Glennon neatly glides over the panoply of
legislative controls put on the authorization and described by Chairman Zablocki in his article. They affected the size, scope, degree of
involvement and duration of the troop deployment in Lebanon.
Mr. Glennon was never further off the mark than in his references
to "verbal window-dressing" 2 3 in the MFLR. Section 5(b) of the War
Powers Resolution was written to enable Congress to invoke the sixty
day period for congressional consideration precisely to take "into account a situation in which the President for whatever reason may decide not to report."'24 The procedure was followed carefully in the
House and Senate action regarding Lebanon and the legislation specifically declared section 5(b) operative. Furthermore, both the House and
the Senate conducted their debates under the priority procedures required by section 6 of the War Powers Resolution. There was nothing
artificial or pretentious about the application of those procedures or the
invocation of section 5(b).
Of course, the MFLR could have been enacted without the use of
Powers Resolution. Such a course of action was what the AdWar
the
ministration originally sought and we are therefore surprised that Mr.
Glennon appears to advocate this approach. The point is, such an action was not undertaken and instead the War Powers Resolution was
reinforced as the appropriate legal framework for legislative-executive
decision-making on the commitment of troops into hostilities.
The persistent argument that the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution constituted a presidential "blank check" is simplistic sophistry. Any cursory reading of the MFLR dispels such an argument. No
one in the executive branch regarded it as such and it was privately
made clear that the eighteen-month authorization would be observed.
Professor Glennon's apparent solution, to seek presidential invocation of section 4(a)(1) or do nothing, would have accomplished the
latter. Aside from scoring election-year political points, one wonders
what Mr. Glennon would have said about the efficacy of the War Pow22. Glennon, supra note 1, at 660 & n.22 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952)).
23. Glennon, supra note 1, at 667.
24. House Report on War Powers, supra note 10, at 10.
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ers Resolution if Congress stood still, leaving the Resolution dormant
and making no attempt to impact on executive action in committing
troops in Lebanon. Yet this would have been precisely the result of
Mr. Glennon's suggested course of action.
No, Mr. Zablocki has nothing to apologize for. By contrast, where
we see the need for true apology and rethinking is in persistent resort to
definitions that lack clarity, legal formalisms devoid of political reality,
adherence to discredited formulas long since rejected, and ideological
purity in defense of fence-sitting.
With respect to Grenada, it is without doubt that presidential reporting under section 4(a)(1) would have been preferable. Since it was
not forthcoming, the House again used the tools it had by invoking
section 4(a)(1). An automatic result is not likely to be forced on a recalcitrant executive until it is clear that Congress will act for the President if he does not comply. By an overwhelming vote of 403-23, the
House followed that course of action." But the Senate after passing
the Hart amendment sixty-four to twenty,26 did not see fit to follow
through on it. The Senate leadership was all too glad to drop the
amendment in the House-Senate conference on the debt ceiling. Efforts to get Senate action on the House bill also went nowhere.
Nonetheless, as pointed out by Representative Zablocki, congressional war powers efforts concerning Grenada did affect the presidential decision to remove troops before the sixty-day time limit had run
out, demonstrating sensitivity to the Resolution and its provisions and
congressional insistence on its application. In this regard, we are perplexed by Professor Glennon's flip-flop regarding section 4(a)(1). Although opposed to Zablocki's insistence on presidential invocation of
section 4(a)(1) with respect to Lebanon, Professor Glennon argues that
Congress should have confronted the Grenada issue "in a more dispassionate setting sixty days after the triggering event."2 7 Surely he cannot
have it both ways.
One cannot help but conclude that Professor Glennon's objections
to the implementation of the Resolution with respect to Lebanon and
Grenada at least in part reflect opposition to the Reagan Administration's foreign policy with respect to those two countries. While reasonable people may disagree over foreign policy actions, it seems wrong to
take out one's frustrations on the War Powers Resolution and advocate
25. 129 CONG. REc. H8933-34 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1983).
26. 129 CONG. REc. S14,876-77 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983).
27. Glennon, supra note 1, at 669.
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its dismantlement to assuage those frustrations. Such a strategy would
be a tragic example of throwing away the baby with the bath water.
Two other points deserve brief comments. First, we cannot improve on the constitutional defense of the War Powers Resolution by
Chairman Zablocki, Senator Javits and others. Nonetheless, we are
troubled by Professor Glennon's contention that, because the vast bulk
of war powers under the Constitution are granted to Congress, this fact
is irrelevant with respect to the Resolution's constitutionality. But
then, having been told in a later section of the Glennon article that
presidents signing bills into law have nothing to do with the actual significance of those laws, we should not be surprised to be told that what
the Constitution says does not matter either.
We also stand by Chairman Zablocki's defense of the continued
constitutionality of section 5(c), Chadha notwithstanding. Long-term
commitments of troops into hostilities are subject to prior congressional
approval under the Constitution. The Commander-in-Chief leads the
armed forces once war is commenced by Congress. While the power to
repel sudden attacks is a presidential prerogative, in no other instance
does war power reside in the Executive and in no instance is this congressional power delegated to the Executive. To suggest, therefore, that
Congress can choose the legislative means for denying unauthorized
aggrandizements of congressional war power is perfectly appropriate
and constitutional.
Furthermore, we must reiterate Professor Eugene Gressman's
sound judgment that the Supreme Court has traditionally stayed away
from disputes over delegations of power in foreign affairs and that
there exist "no guidelines in the Constitution to guide the courts in trying to rearrange the war powers as between the President and the Congress."2 In the event of a hypothetical use of section 5(c), Congress
need not have approval of its action from the Supreme Court, only
unwillingness to block effective implementation of that section. Nonjusticiability will suffice.
For one who wishes "the Court had disposed of Chadha on narrower grounds,"29 Professor Glennon seems to take particular delight
in giving Chadha its widest possible reach and providing grist for the
mill of executive branch lawyers whose ultimate dream is to turn Congress into a powerless debating society. Any more help like this, to
paraphrase Professor Glennon and Justice Hugh Black, and we shall be
28. The United States Supreme Court Decsion Concerning the Legislative Veto, 1983."
Hearings Before the House Comm on ForeignAffairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1983).
29. Glennon, supra note 1, at 663.
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undone.3o
We are intrigued by Professor Glennon's parting comments that a
courageous, forthright Congress would not need a War Powers Resolution. By that logic, only a cowardly, spineless Congress needs a War
Powers Resolution. Such comments are political nonsense.
The War Powers Resolution is effective, flexible legislation which
enables Congress to exercise its war powers responsibilities under the
Constitution in a whole range of foreign policy scenarios short of declared war and beyond rescue missions of Americans abroad. The use
of the Resolution in Lebanon is precisely in the range of hostility situations envisioned by the authors. Regardless of the eventual foreign
policy outcome, the framework of the Resolution was effective in meeting Congress' responsibilities.
As usual, Professor Glennon does not tell us what his alternative
would be. Perhaps it is funding cut-offs that can only be used in the
most extreme cases without presidential waivers. Or perhaps it is nonbinding resolutions rouged with great political rhetoric which do nothing to rein in the Executive pursuit of war. Professor Glennon would
give us a congressional emperor with no clothes.
In conclusion, we must say that for those of us hunkered in the
political trenches of Washington, seeking to strengthen congressional
war-making prerogatives and improve the effective implementation of
the War Powers Resolution, the scholarly legal community can serve
an extremely useful purpose in criticizing, analyzing, and suggesting
useful improvements to the Resolution. It is even more unfortunate,
therefore, that instead of achieving those useful objectives the Glennon
critique comes as an unfortunate form of "friendly fire" that lands in
the legislative trenches of the war powers battlefield. Carrying a torch
for shop-worn ideas, long since rejected, will do nothing to improve the
Resolution.

30. Id. at 669 & n.54 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).

